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I. Introduction  
 
In December 2011, at the annual Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Durban (COP17), 
Parties took decisions on the creation of new market-based mechanisms, a topic 
which had already been under discussion for several years, but with little progress 
(Marcu, 2011). COP17 took the decision to pursue two tracks. First, it decided to 
establish a centralised “new market-based mechanism” (NMM) that should be 
operated “under the guidance and authority of the COP” (UNFCCC, 2011). Second, 
it resolved to consider the establishment of a framework for “various approaches, 
including opportunities for using markets” (UNFCCC, 2011). For both the NMM 
(UNFCCC, 2011) and the Framework for Various Approaches (FVA) (UNFCCC, 
2011) the UN conducted a work programme during 2012, with the aim to “elaborate 
modalities and procedures” for the former and “with a view to recommending a 
decision” for the latter (UNFCCC, 2011). Both processes were to culminate at 
COP18 in Doha in December 2012. However, due to fundamental differences 
between the Parties on key issues little progress was made and COP 18 therefore 
requested the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) to conduct another two work programmes with somewhat more specificity 
on what issues are to be considered (UNFCCC, 2012a). 
 
The reason for opting for a dual approach with respect to the creation of new market-
based mechanisms is that a compromise had to be reached to address the diverging 
views of Parties (Marcu, 2011; Sterk et al., 2011). The submissions of Parties in the 
run-up to Durban had revealed a substantial divide between the views of countries. 
On the one hand, countries like Japan, New Zealand and the United States of 
America (US) have expressed a clear preference for decentralised governance of new 
market-based mechanisms, allowing for an “efficient, effective and flexible 
approach” suited to national circumstances and needs. On the other hand, the 
European Union (EU) and developing countries have favoured more centralised 
governance with common rules and a strong supervisory body ensuring the 
mechanism’s smooth functioning and guaranteeing its environmental integrity (de 
Sépibus et al., 2011). 
 
Japan and jurisdictions in North America are in fact already pursuing decentralised 
approaches outside the UNFCCC framework. Japan is devoting substantial resources 
to establishing a “Bilateral Offset Credit Mechanism (BOCM)” with developing and 
emerging economies. In North America, the US state of California and the Canadian 
province of Québec established emission trading systems in 2013 and plan to link 
them with each other. California and Québec may also develop their own 
international offset systems. These developments raise the question whether and 
under what conditions internationally traded emission credits that are generated 
outside the UNFCCC should be allowed to be used for meeting the emission 
reduction pledges made under the UNFCCC for the post-2012 period. 
 
Given the numerous studies that have already been undertaken on centralised new 
market mechanisms (Butzengeiger-Geyer et al., 2012; Harrison et al., 2011; 
Butzengeiger et al., 2010; OECD, 2010; Aasrud et al., 2009; Schneider and Cames, 
2009; Schmidt et al., 2008), this study puts the emphasis on the possible roles and 
design options for the FVA. It is structured as follows. First, it presents the Parties’ 
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positions on the FVA (UNFCCC, 2012b). Second, it explores the various functions 
of the FVA. Third, it presents possible design options and evaluates them in the light 
of the objectives set by the outcome of the AWG-LCA in Durban (UNFCCC, 2011). 
 
Regarding the scope of this article it is important to note that in the authors’ view the 
UNFCCC and, hence, the FVA has a role only in relation to mechanisms with 
international application, such as the Japanese BOCM. The authors see no need for 
the UNFCCC to concern itself with systems that operate purely domestically, such as 
the systems currently being developed in China, since whatever happens within 
national borders will be captured in that Party’s national emissions inventory. The 
question for the UNFCCC is how to handle systems where emission reductions that 
are achieved in one country are supposed to be traded internationally and counted 
towards the emission target of another country.    
 
 
II. Countries’ positions on the FVA  
 
There were 25 submissions by Parties on the FVA in 2012, both from developed and 
developing countries (UNFCCC, 2012b). These positions were by and large repeated 
at two UNFCCC workshops in 2012 and at COP 18 (Sterk et al., 2012). 
 
While among developed countries the EU, Norway and Switzerland are the 
proponents of a robust common system for unit generation and accounting, arguing 
that a centralised approach is needed to ensure environmental integrity, Japan, New 
Zealand and the US are strongly in favour of a variety of approaches reflecting 
national circumstances including a decentralized governance approach. Australia has 
adopted a similar though less explicit position. At COP 18 in Doha the other 
countries of the “Umbrella Group”1, except Norway, also endorsed this position.  
 
The EU’s submission on the FVA stresses that any “tradable emission reduction 
units” resulting from the FVA would have to “meet the same standards” as those 
developed under the centralised NMM. Norway’s submission underlines the 
indispensability of a robust common framework for unit accounting, which should be 
established along the lines of the GHG accounting system set up by the Kyoto 
Protocol and ensure the fungibility with Kyoto units. According to Switzerland, 
Parties should establish standards that ensure that the mechanisms developed under 
the FVA are of comparable quality, foster the fungibility of units and provide 
security to the private sector regarding their use. The UNFCCC would define 
common standards that include inter alia rules on the avoidance of double-counting, 
methodologies for crediting thresholds and rules on the tracking of units. Finally, 
Switzerland suggests that a process should be set up that allows the verification of 
whether the mechanisms meet the internationally agreed standards.  
 
Japan had two submissions in 2012 and posits that a “one-size-fits-all” approach 
will not be the best suited for addressing the complex issues that Parties have to 
address in mitigating climate change. It also points to difficulties with the CDM 
(such as high transaction costs, inequitable geographical distribution, and 
                                                
1 Australia, Canada, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, 
and the US 
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disproportionate CER issuance from certain types of projects) as a reason for calling 
for new mechanisms with decentralised governance. It views the FVA as a means to 
develop its own approaches and favours a decentralised governance system which 
allows Parties to develop their own standards, with assistance from the COP in 
providing basic principles and reporting rules and supporting Parties through the 
provision of best practices. Standards for implementation, however, would be 
developed by the Parties themselves.  
 
In line with Japan’s submission, New Zealand favours a decentralised governance 
system attributing no coercive or punitive powers to the UNFCCC, but an important 
coordination and guidance provision role, notably on how transparency can be 
ensured, how minimum common standards could be developed and how the 
international tracking of units can be guaranteed. To address the need for 
transparency New Zealand proposes the application of a “declaration model” under 
which Parties would provide information on the principal elements of the 
mechanism, which would then be made available by the Secretariat to other Parties 
for inspection. New Zealand suggests that if the declaration model approach was 
integrated into the biennial reports and the International Assessment and Review 
(IAR) and International Consultation and Analysis (ICA) processes for developed 
and developing countries that were established at COP 16 in Cancún to assess 
emission reduction progress in the post-2012 period, this would provide assurance 
that Parties were using market mechanisms in accordance with the details of their 
declaration.  
 
Like Japan and New Zealand, the US views the task of the UNFCCC as purely 
facilitative, possibly playing a role in the tracking of units and the avoidance of 
double counting, but having no say in determining whether the credits may be used 
for compliance to meet international mitigation targets. While common principles for 
new mechanisms might be agreed under the UNFCCC, it would be left to 
governments to individually determine whether or not credits were generated 
according to these principles.. To ensure transparency, the US stresses that any 
credits transferred internationally would have to be recorded in a registry. Further, 
Parties should provide detailed information on the use of standards and 
methodologies through existing channels for measuring, reporting and verification 
(MRV) in the UNFCCC, including biennial reporting. Similarly to New Zealand, the 
US suggests that any international transfer of credits could, for instance, be examined 
as part of the IAR and ICA processes, which would provide Parties the opportunity 
to request clarification. These processes could finally draw upon an international 
tracking system to verify that units reported in biennial reports are unique. 
 
While not as explicit in its rejection of common standards as Japan, New Zealand 
and the US, Australia also expresses a preference for a merely facilitative role for 
the FVA. It proposes to make “arrangements for reporting on the design and 
operation of a MBA [market-based approach] against agreed information parameters, 
review by technical experts, discussion of MBAs through peer review or peer 
dialogue”, but makes not mention that the FVA should have an approval function. As 
noted above, in Doha there was a further submission by the Umbrella Group minus 
Norway, which also followed this line. 
 
 
 4 
The most comprehensive submission from developing countries stems from AOSIS. 
Representing probably the opposite extreme to the US position, it states that any 
units that are used by developed Parties to meet their mitigation commitments under 
the KP or the Convention will have to be based on a common set of internationally-
agreed rules. Stressing the risks attached to programmes that use different accounting 
rules and diverging baseline methodologies and entail a significant risk of double 
counting, AOSIS states that only units that are established at the international level, 
apply internationally agreed accounting rules and baselines, operate in internationally 
agreed sectors and are under direct international oversight should be recognised.  
 
According to Bangladesh on behalf of a group of developing countries,2 the role of 
the FVA is to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development and 
poverty eradication, while helping developed country Parties achieve compliance 
with their commitments under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. In their view, 
a regulatory body, operating under the authority of the COP, should oversee the FVA 
and ensure that a mechanism for the settlement of disputes is established. Papua 
New Guinea highlights that the FVA should include a “labelling function” to ensure 
that units are generated in conformity with standards elaborated under the UNFCCC.  
 
China’s submission on the FVA reiterates the existing position that market 
mechanisms should only be available to developed country Parties that have 
committed to internationally legally binding emission reduction targets.  
 
Bolivia also stresses that all mechanisms must operate under the COP and that 
bilateral or regional agreements should not be eligible for compliance with emission 
targets under the UNFCCC. In addition, Bolivia highlights that the FVA is intended 
to address not only market-based, but also non-market approaches and proposes the 
establishment of a "Climate Justice Mechanism". Bolivia considers that 
industrialised countries’ historical emissions constitute an ecological debt that 
requires a mechanism for compensatory payment. This position was later also 
subscribed to by the entire Group of “Like-Minded Developing Countries” 3. 
 
Being composed of Lichtenstein, Mexico, Monaco, South Korea and Switzerland, 
the Environmental Integrity Group straddles the Annex I – non-Annex I divide. Its 
submission stresses the need for common accounting elements and guidance for 
common standards and posits that the FVA should perform “conformity checks to 
allow recognition of activities as eligible for meeting emission reduction 
commitments under the Convention”. The common standards would inter alia 
include eligibility criteria for Parties, MRV, avoidance of double counting, net 
decrease and/or avoidance of emissions, and additionality when setting baselines.    
 
3.2 The way forward 
 
From the submissions and the discussion repeated at the negotiating sessions in 
Bonn, Bangkok and Doha it is obvious that very little consensus has yet been reached 
                                                
2 Bangladesh, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, 
Kenya, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Suriname and Uganda. 
3 Bolivia, China, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Iran, Iraq, 
Malaysia, Mali, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Venezuela. 
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with respect to the governance and the roles of the FVA. While the Umbrella Group 
with the exception of Norway favour a predominantly “bottom-up” approach, the 
Western European and developing countries argue that a centralised approach is 
needed to ensure environmental integrity. Given these political differences, it is 
doubtful that a bold decision will be taken on market mechanisms, be it at the level 
of the NMM or the FVA, in the near future. As a result, the current bilateral and 
regional bottom-up initiatives might well be further developed and implemented 
without any oversight, but also without recognition by the UNFCCC process.  
  
The current deadlock, however, is no reason to abandon the concept of market 
mechanisms at the UNFCCC level altogether. There is a clear need to explore further 
the potential roles of a FVA and the possible designs of its governance. The two 
following sections will attempt to shed some light on these crucial issues. 
 
III. Different roles of the FVA  
 
Three potential roles of the FVA can be derived from Parties’ submissions 
(UNFCCC, 2012d). 
 
Assisting developed countries in achieving their emission targets: Unlike the 
provisions regarding the NMM, the texts agreed upon in Durban and Doha do not 
mention whether credits generated by mechanisms meeting the conditions of the 
FVA may be used for compliance with post-2012 targets. Japan, New Zealand and 
the US, however, have made clear that they want to be able to do so (UNFCCC, 
2012b). Indeed, if this was not the case, the international credits issued by Japan 
under its bilateral market-based mechanisms or the international offsets accepted 
under the Californian ETS could not be counted towards the respective national post-
2012 pledges.  
 
Ensuring environmental integrity as well as achieving net emission reductions: 
To ensure that the overall environmental outcome is not undermined, it is necessary 
to make sure that new mechanisms “deliver real, permanent, additional and verified 
mitigation outcomes”, in other words that “a tonne is a tonne”, irrespective of where 
it comes from. In addition, and in contrast to the CDM, new market mechanisms are 
supposed to go beyond mere offsetting and achieve a net reduction of GHG 
emissions. All submissions that address the issue of baselines and crediting 
thresholds therefore agree that the latter should be set below business as usual (BAU) 
levels, so that host countries would have to make a unilateral contribution to GHG 
emission reductions before credits can be generated (Sterk, 2012).  
 
Coherence of the international carbon market: Currently, several market-based 
mechanisms are about to be implemented by Parties that may operate outside UN-
based rules. Parties and observers are concerned that this activity may result in a 
fragmentation of the carbon market, decreasing the cost efficiency of international 
climate policy. In particular business organisations maintain that private sector 
involvement will crucially depend on the fungibility of credits generated through 
different approaches (CMIA, 2012). One of the potential roles the FVA may assume 
is hence to provide the “glue” that connects and recognises future national and 
regional mechanisms under the UNFCCC (Sterk, 2012). 
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Overall, a consensus seems to emerge that the FVA should create a process that 
recognises approaches developed outside the UNFCCC, allow units created 
thereunder to count towards post-2012 emission targets, as well as ensure that such 
approaches meet recognised standards for environmental integrity and "enhance the 
transparency and consistency in the generation and use of units from these 
approaches" (UNFCCC, 2012d). 
 
IV. Design options under the FVA 
 
While pursuing similar goals, Parties display a wide variety of views on the design 
options that should be used under the FVA. In their presentation at the UNFCCC 
workshop on the FVA on 19 May 2012, New Zealand identified five types of 
functions for the UN, which could, if need be, also be combined, i.e. a “Library of 
Parties’ Approaches”, a “Reviewer of Mechanisms”, a “Provider of Best Practice 
Guidance”, a “Rule Setter” and a “Centralised Approval Process” (New Zealand 
government, 2012). Building on this typology, this section of the paper explores how 
the various options could be implemented and how they interrelate.  
a.  The “Library of Parties’ Approaches” 
 
The “Library” reflects a model where the involvement of the UN is limited to 
providing transparency on various market approaches (hereafter “mechanisms”) 
developed by Parties and to allow other Parties to scrutinise them. There would be no 
international assessment of the accuracy of the information provided by Parties.  
 
The “lightest-touch” version of this model implies that Parties that have established a 
mechanism under the FVA are requested to provide basic information, possibly in 
English, on their procedures, projects and institutional setup, as Japan has done for 
its bilateral offset credit mechanism in its “New Mechanisms Information Platform”.4  
 
A more sophisticated model of the Library could foresee that in addition to their own 
websites Parties would have to provide information to the Secretariat according to 
standardised reporting formats. The Secretariat would then be entrusted with the task 
of compiling the information and displaying it on its website in a user-friendly form. 
This would ensure that the information provided by the Parties could be compared 
easily.  
 
b.  The “Reviewer of Mechanisms” 
  
Building on the elements developed under the library approach, the Reviewer of 
Mechanisms model adds the obligation to submit the mechanisms to an international 
UN-based review process. Decisions would have to be made to determine its scope, 
objectives, frequency, processes and outputs.  
 
The scope of a review would depend to a large extent on the form of governance 
chosen by the Parties (de Sépibus et al., 2011). If it follows a decentralised model a 
review would cover only the most basic elements. In particular, no review of the 
                                                
4 See http://www.mmechanisms.org/e/ 
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environmental integrity of individual projects carried out under the mechanisms 
would be undertaken.  
 
Under a more centralised governance model, a review could play a far more 
extensive role. As proposed by the European Union on the NMM, the review could 
cover guidelines on MRV, the coverage of sectors and gases, baselines and crediting 
thresholds as well as criteria to determine their contribution to sustainable 
development (UNFCCC, 2012c).  
 
In terms of process, the two-stage review foreseen by the IAR, including, most 
notably, a technical review and an international assessment, provides an interesting 
model. During the technical review, a team of experts checks the transparency, 
accuracy, completeness and consistency with reporting guidelines, as well as the 
comparability and timeliness of the information provided by the Parties and draws up 
a technical report. Notably, the Party concerned may interact with the experts and 
“share any additional information or views”.5 The second stage is a multilateral 
assessment, which allows a written and oral exchange of views on the technical 
review and other documents between the Party concerned and other Parties or 
observers under the aegis of the Subsidiary Body of Implementation (SBI). The SBI 
forwards conclusions to the relevant bodies under the Convention. 
 
The suitability of the IAR review process depends on the scope of the review. If it 
covers some basic principles, a two-stage review as foreseen by the IAR represents a 
viable option. While the accuracy and the consistency of the information provided by 
Parties may be checked during the technical review, the multilateral assessment gives 
Parties a good opportunity to gain a more in-depth understanding of the functioning 
of the Mechanism. 
 
If, by contrast, the scope of the review also covers the compliance of individual 
projects with international rules, the two-stage IAR model is inappropriate. In this 
case, a “mixed” review process, comprising a two-stage review for the assessment of 
the basic principles and a more “light-touch” technical review of all other rules set at 
the international level might represent a good compromise.  
 
Irrespective of the scope and design of the review, it is important to keep in mind that 
under the “Reviewer of mechanism model” no international institution or body 
would be empowered to approve or reject a mechanism or the projects carried out 
under it. The output of the reviews would be limited to non-binding 
recommendations for the Party concerned.  
 
c.  A “Provider of Best Practice Guidance” 
A Provider of best Practice Guidance model may fulfil several purposes. For 
instance, best practice guidance may serve as a source of information and trigger 
discussions among Parties that wish to set up new mechanisms. It can further ensure 
that lessons learned from Parties that are more advanced in this process are shared 
widely and will assist Parties that want to develop such mechanisms. Finally, it can 
help Parties to identify problems and gaps with respect to the mechanisms they have 
set up, but wish to improve. 
                                                
5 See 2/CP. 17, Annex II.  
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The development of best practice guidance presupposes that Parties are able to agree 
on a set of evaluation criteria. In this respect the Durban decision on various 
approaches provides some principles in paragraph 83. Although the conditions set 
out therein leave considerable leeway for interpretation, they provide a valuable 
starting point. Given their lack of precision, it is, however, all the more important 
that the process leading to establishment of best practices is designed carefully.  
 
An interesting model in this respect is provided by the process that has allowed the 
formulation of good practices for Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs) 
(UNFCCC, 2007). It took place over several years and involved a set of different 
actors. Initially, a mandate was given to the Expert Group on Technology Transfer 
(EGTT), whose task was to identify ways to facilitate the transfer of technology. 
Organised by the Secretariat, a series of workshops were held with representatives of 
governments and international organisations, as well as experts, to explore various 
options. Further, a survey on the implementation of TNAs was conducted to provide 
first-hand experience. Based on these findings a handbook was issued that provided 
step-by-step guidance on how to transfer technology. The latter was then field-tested 
and progressively refined. Based on these insights, the EGTT issued 
recommendations for good practices to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA). Overall, this example shows that the provision of 
best practice guidance may be a lengthy process requiring the input of a wide variety 
of stakeholders.  
 
If best practice guidance were to be provided for the mechanisms, an international 
body or institution would have to be entrusted with a clear mandate and endowed 
with sufficient financial means to carry out the task. The International Carbon Action 
Partnership (ICAP) intends to share best practices for countries establishing 
emissions trading schemes. There are, however, strong arguments for situating such 
an international body within the UNFCCC. While the procedures and routines 
through which it operates have been criticized as not being sufficiently effective, the 
UNFCCC represents the most comprehensive effort at multilateral cooperation and 
has afforded the UN an unrivalled degree of legitimacy and experience with 
greenhouse gas market mechanisms. It has put in place a sophisticated framework for 
formal negotiations and technical implementation and is endowed with an 
infrastructure comprising a professional staff of experts (Mehling, 2011).  
 
In terms of substance and minimisation of transaction costs it would seem 
appropriate to entrust an already existing body with this task, for example the CDM 
Executive Board or the related unit of the UNFCCC Secretariat. If the Board was 
mandated to closely engage with and derive best practice from the emerging new 
mechanisms, this might also help to cross-fertilise the development of new schemes 
and the ongoing CDM reform. However, critics might assume that the Board would 
be too set in its own ways of doing things and would be biased against new 
approaches. Given that, as outlined above, one of the motivations behind 
developments such as the Japanese BOCM is strong disaffection with the CDM, the 
countries in favour of bottom-up approaches might prefer to have a new body 
installed for the provision of best-practice guidance. 
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d.  The “Rule Setter” Model 
 
Before exploring some design options for the Rule Setter model, a few clarifications 
are necessary. From a national law perspective “rules” are usually qualified as legally 
binding norms that are enforceable. From an international treaty law perspective, the 
meaning of a “rule” or a legally binding norm is more ambiguous. Based on a 
conventional international law treaty analysis, rules are only legally binding if they 
have received state consent and/or are adopted by an institution upon which the 
explicit authority to legislate has been conferred by its constituent treaty (Brunnée, 
2002).  
  
Through the lens of a conventional analysis, the COP may not play an important 
rule-making role. This “formal perspective”, however, does not provide an entirely 
satisfactory account of the role played by the COP in the field of law-making, in 
particular within the ambit of the flexible mechanisms. Hence, when referring to 
rules in this section, we do not refer exclusively to legally binding norms in a strict 
sense, but include all types of norms that have been adopted in the application of 
formally agreed procedural rules and which effectively influence the conduct of 
Parties and/or private actors (Brunnée, 2002).  
 
In contrast to best practice guidance, which, if violated, does not entail sanctions, the 
breach of rules is not without consequences. For example, if a mechanism of a Party 
does not comply with rules set by the UN, the credits generated under it may not be 
taken into account in assessing compliance with the mitigation targets of that Party.  
 
The question of the scope of the rule-setting is crucial in two respects. First, it 
determines the degree of control the international community has over the design of 
the mechanisms. If, for instance, “lawmaking” is limited to the setting of criteria for 
purposes of complying with disclosure requirements, Parties would remain 
essentially free of any constraints with respect to the design and implementation of 
their mechanisms.  
 
Second, it is relevant for shaping the procedural rules governing the rule-setting 
process. If the “legislative” activities are meant to remain limited, then the COP 
could set the rules itself. If, on the contrary, the scope of the rules was to be extended 
to criteria regarding the institutional setup of the mechanism or even further, then the 
COP would have to set up a subsidiary body responsible for the rule-setting process, 
as it has done under the CDM. If the model of the CDM was to be followed, due 
account would have to be taken of the specificities of the FVA and the limitations 
that the design of the CDM governance has shown over time (Streck et al., 2008). 
 
e.  A “Centralised Approval Process”  
 
The adoption of a rule-setter model as defined here necessarily implies the setup of a 
centralised approval process. Indeed, only if there is a centralised process during 
which the compliance of a mechanism with UN-based rules can be assessed and, in 
the case of a violation, sanctioned, will the rule-setter model be able to shape state 
conduct.  
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Various options have been discussed in the literature regarding the institutional and 
procedural requirements of a centralised approval process (de Sépibus et al., 2011). 
Some of the key questions that will have to be addressed concern the composition, 
the functioning, and the financial endowment of the institution or the body that will 
carry out this task (Bakker et al., 2012).  
 
The institutional and procedural setup of the CDM provides an interesting model. In 
this case, all major governance functions, including oversight of methodologies, 
baselines, compliance and the issuance of credits, would be controlled by the 
UNFCCC (de Sépibus et al., 2011). Major design failures of the CDM model, such 
as the insufficient independence of the verifiers, should however be addressed 
appropriately.  
 
The EU in its submission on an NMM builds on this approach, but posits that while 
there should be a common set of rules, including inter alia rules defining the sectors 
and the coverage of gases, the methods and criteria for determining baselines or the 
crediting thresholds or sector targets, flexibility could be retained for some more 
detailed design features and, as a rule, the implementation should rest with the host 
country (UNFCCC, 2012c).  
  
f.  The proposed typology and its combinations 
  
This paper concludes that some of the models need to be implemented in 
combination with others. Hence, a review may be implemented only if some 
information has been disclosed previously by Parties and a rule-setter model may not 
be applied without a centralised approval process. The various models may further be 
combined piecemeal, applying a Library model to certain aspects of the Mechanisms 
while favouring a rule-setter model for others. For example, one option could be to 
combine a Library model for the implementation of projects with a review for the 
compliance of the Mechanism with basic principles. Another option could confer a 
rule-setter role upon the UN, regarding certain minimal institutional requirements, 
and a mandate to develop best practices for the implementation of projects.  
 
g.  The Typology and Parties’ Positions 
 
The following table provides an overview of the five types and their key features, as 
discussed above, and attempts to map Parties’ positions against the typology. As 
discussed in Section II, there seems little common ground as Parties are apparently 
divided into two sharply opposed camps. While the Umbrella Group minus Norway 
strictly rejects giving the UN any kind of approval function, AOSIS, Bangladesh et 
al., Bolivia, the Environmental Integrity Group, the EU and Norway have also stated 
unambiguously that only UN-approved credits should be used for achieving targets. 
Therefore, none of the five options seems to have the potential to be acceptable to 
both groups of Parties. 
  
 11 
Table 1: Design options and Parties’ positions 
Type Key features Party positions 
Library of Parties’ 
Approaches 
UN role limited to 
providing transparency, 
collects information on 
Parties’ approaches, 
possibly in standardised 
format, user-friendly 
publication format enables 
scrutiny of approaches by 
others  
In line with positions of 
Umbrella Group minus 
Norway 
Not strict enough for 
AOSIS, Bangladesh et al., 
Bolivia, Papua New 
Guinea, EU, Norway, 
Environmental Integrity 
Group 
Reviewer of Mechanisms UN reviews Parties’ 
approaches based on 
agreed criteria, either only 
systems or also individual 
projects 
In line with positions of 
Umbrella Group minus 
Norway 
Not strict enough for 
AOSIS et al. 
Provider of Best Practice 
Guidance 
UN develops non-binding 
best practice guidance 
based on agreed criteria 
In line with positions of 
Umbrella Group minus 
Norway 
Not strict enough for 
AOSIS et al. 
Rule Setter UN sets binding rules, 
only approaches that 
comply with rules may be 
used for meeting targets 
In line with positions of 
AOSIS et al. 
Too strict for Umbrella 
Group minus Norway 
Centralised Approval 
Process 
Centralised assessment of 
approaches’ compliance 
with binding UN rules 
In line with positions of 
AOSIS et al. 
Too strict for Umbrella 
Group minus Norway 
 
 
V. Evaluation of the various designs with the Durban 
mandate 
 
As decided in Durban, the FVA should ensure that the standards adopted by Parties 
deliver real, permanent, additional and verified mitigation outcomes, avoid double 
counting of efforts, and achieve a net decrease and/or avoidance of GHG emissions. 
Any governance design will hence have to be measured in the light of these 
benchmarks set by Parties.   
 
a.  Standards that deliver real, permanent, additional and 
verified mitigation outcomes and achieve a net decrease 
and/or avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions 
 
The requirements that the standards used by Parties must “deliver real, permanent, 
additional and verified mitigation outcomes” and “achieve a net decrease and/or 
avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions” boil down to the claim that the 
“environmental integrity” of the credits must be ensured. The notion at the heart of 
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the latter is the definition of “business as usual” (BaU), or in other words “what 
would have happened in the absence of the mechanism”? It is this inherent relativity 
of the notion of BaU which makes the debate on how to ensure the environmental 
integrity of international offset credits and, correspondingly, what the right level of 
governance for defining a robust FVA would be, so challenging.  
 
Given that both buyer and seller countries of international credits have strong 
incentives to generate as many credits as possible, Parties favouring a more 
centralised approach towards governance stress the need for some form of 
international oversight that brings the reasonableness of the underlying assumptions 
under scrutiny and that may require changes if necessary. The Parties favouring a 
decentralised approach of governance, on the other hand, posit that flexibility and 
diversity is not contrary to environmental integrity provided that transparency is 
ensured. 
 
Transparency is at the heart of the Library model. It allows scrutiny and thereby puts 
pressure on Parties to use reasonable assumptions and standards when establishing a 
mechanism. It is also vital to build trust that others are not cheating or abusing the 
mechanisms in the pursuit of other goals. To enable the information to be checked by 
other Parties without too much effort, it must, however, also be presented in a 
comprehensible manner. In addition, the information must be complete and display 
all the crucial elements of a mechanism. Finally, new social media, in particular 
video debates, online fora and chat areas on the UNFCCC website, as well as 
stakeholder platforms on the model of the “high-level policy dialogue on the CDM” 
could foster the exchange of ideas in a more informal but probably effective way. 
Only if these requisites are fulfilled, could the Library Model contribute towards 
nurturing confidence in the reality of the emission reductions achieved through a 
mechanism.  
 
Whether information disclosure alone will be sufficient to guarantee the 
environmental integrity of international carbon credits remains to be seen. In the 
absence of an international review mechanism it will be up to interested Parties or 
actors from civil society to verify whether the information supplied is correct and 
provides sufficient safeguards regarding the environmental integrity of the credits. 
Such a check, however, requires both significant resources and in-depth knowledge. 
Finally, if the requirement for transparency is not combined with a duty to respond to 
questions and/or to remedy problems, there is a considerable risk that the pressure 
from stakeholders will not be strong enough to ensure the development of a 
reasonable set of standards.  
 
An international UN-based review would ensure that the information disclosed is 
analysed in a systematic way by experts and possibly discussed by political bodies. 
The effectiveness of any review, however, depends very much on its scope, the 
resources devoted to it, the competence of the experts carrying it out, their 
independence, and the possibility of cross-checking information. Also, the absence of 
a right of the international community to suggest amendments or to sanction possible 
violations of international principles may substantially reduce the effectiveness of 
this instrument.  
   
The best practices model provides an interesting tool for standard setting. Given the 
reluctance of many Parties to adopt coercive international rules, it may provide a 
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good middle way to develop standards step-by-step, based on the sharing of the 
knowledge of a wide array of stakeholders, involving representatives from both civil 
society and governments. The effectiveness of this model in ensuring the 
“environmental integrity” of credits will, however, very much depend on the process 
through which the standards are developed.  
 
The rule-setter model, combined with a centralised approval process, offers three 
major advantages. First, it provides an effective counterweight to the inherent 
incentives of bilateral offset agreements to artificially inflate the number of credits 
generated. Second, common rules will have to be adopted according to a uniform 
procedure accepted by all Parties. Third, all Parties have to abide by a common set of 
rules, and in the case of violation they may be sanctioned. While these characteristics 
provide valuable safeguards for maintaining a level playing field and the respect of 
fundamental principles of procedural fairness, centralised governance by itself does 
not constitute a guarantee of an environmentally sound outcome. Indeed, 
notwithstanding the “top-down” architecture of the CDM, the environmental 
integrity of many of its credits remains disputed (de Sépibus et al., 2011). Hence, the 
scope of the rules, a robust institutional design, including the ability to carry out 
reforms to address unforeseen shortcomings, sufficient resources and the possibility 
to apply effective sanctions for clear violations by Parties will be crucial to ensure 
the environmental integrity of the mechanisms.  
b.  Standards that avoid double-counting of efforts 
 
If credits resulting from the FVA are used for compliance by developed countries, it 
is necessary to avoid the emission reductions they represent also being taken into 
account by developing countries in the fulfilment of their pledges. In such cases the 
same emissions reductions would be effectively counted twice in the global 
mitigation effort.  
 
By providing transparency on the origin of the credits generated under the 
mechanisms, the Library model contributes to addressing the problem of double 
counting. However, it offers no solution in the case of conflicts. The same is true for 
the review and the best practices models. As none of these models provides 
enforceable rules regarding the attribution of credits in case of conflict, the risk of 
double-counting cannot be addressed with sufficient stringency.  
 
To avoid double-counting, the only reliable solution would probably be provided by 
a rule-setter model, under which international rules, comprising inter alia common 
accounting rules for all countries, rules clarifying the “ownership” of international 
credits, and an international and national registry system comparable to the one that 
has been set up under the Kyoto Protocol would be made available.  
 
Under Kyoto, all emission units sold by an industrialised country are deducted from 
its assigned amount. Developing countries, the US, and those countries that will not 
join the second Kyoto period, will not have AAUs post-2012, so another way of 
deducting sold units from pledges would need to be found. One potential option 
would be to add these units to the countries’ emission inventories. That is, the 
inventory would show x tonnes of emissions, and to that total y further tonnes would 
be added for each tonne of emission reductions the country has sold. The pledge 
would then be compared to the sum of x+y. 
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VI. Conclusions 
 
Currently, emissions trading markets are emerging worldwide, bottom-up, in many 
regions or countries, such as in California, China, Japan and South Korea. While 
most of the emerging systems would only be domestic in scope, some of them, such 
as the Japanese BOCM, are being designed to have international application. This 
may possibly lead to a fragmented international carbon market outside the UN 
framework and thereby undermine the environmental integrity of the UNFCCC. In 
this context, the Durban Climate Conference agreed to consider the establishment of 
an overall framework for various mitigation approaches, including opportunities for 
using markets. 
 
From the submissions of the Parties, three key roles for the FVA may be 
distinguished: to assist developed countries in achieving their emission targets, to 
ensure environmental integrity and achieve global net emission reductions, and to 
guarantee the coherence of the international carbon market. 
 
This paper discussed and evaluated several design options for the FVA that range 
from decentralised to centralised: a “Library of Parties’ Approach”, a “Reviewer of 
mechanisms”, a “Provider of best Practice Guidance”, a “Rule Setter” and a 
“Centralised Approval Process”. The analysis shows that some of the models could 
be, and others need to be, implemented in combination with others.  
 
The Library model allows scrutiny and puts pressure on Parties to use reasonable 
standards when establishing a mechanism. Its effectiveness in guaranteeing the 
environmental integrity of credits, however, is limited if it is not combined with a 
duty of the concerned Party to remedy possible problems. Moreover, in the absence 
of an international review that ensures that the information disclosed is analysed in a 
systematic way, it is uncertain whether Parties will be able to play an efficient 
supervisory role. The Review model addresses some of these problems, as it entails 
carrying out an international review. Its performance, however, will very much 
depend on its scope and the resources that are devoted to it. Also, in the absence of a 
sanctioning power of the international community, it may remain a blunt tool rather 
than a sharp stick. The Best Practices model may provide a good middle way to 
develop standards step-by-step, based on the sharing of the knowledge of a large 
array of stakeholders. Its effectiveness in ensuring a sound environmental outcome 
will, however, hinge on how the standard setting process is framed and whether best 
practices are broadly followed by Parties. The Rule-Setter model finally, combined 
with a Centralised Approval process, may offer major advantages, providing an 
effective safeguard against the temptation for Parties to inflate artificially the number 
of credits generated, a uniform standard setting procedure and a common set of rules. 
In the case of violation, Parties may be sanctioned. While these characteristics 
provide valuable safeguards for maintaining a level playing field, centralised 
governance by itself does not guarantee the environmental integrity of the credits 
generated. As the experience with the CDM has shown, a robust institutional design, 
sufficient resources and the possibility to impose effective sanctions for clear 
violations by Parties will be vital to ensure a satisfactory outcome.  
 
It is difficult to foresee how the negotiations on the FVA will play out as widely 
differing opinions have been expressed by Parties on how to flesh out the system. 
While our analysis suggests that the Rule-Setter model combined with the 
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Centralised Approval process would be best suited for fulfilling the criteria set out in 
the Durban decision – and this view is probably subscribed to by a large majority of 
Parties – most of the Umbrella Group countries, in particular Japan, New Zealand 
and the US, have so far been strongly against assigning any oversight role to the 
UNFCCC. They would therefore only accept the Library model, the Reviewer model 
and the Best Practice model. By contrast, Western European countries and most 
developing ones have so far insisted just as strongly on binding rules with 
international oversight. They would therefore only accept the Rule-Setter model with 
Centralised Approval. These fundamentally diverging views will be hard to bridge.  
 
However, the Umbrella Group countries (minus Norway) have a political advantage 
since the Reviewer model is the current status quo. With the Cancún Agreements, the 
UNFCCC has adopted a system of voluntary pledges with an international review 
process but no common accounting. While there is no agreement that units from 
bilateral systems such as the BOCM may be used for achieving the pledges, there is 
also no system to prevent countries from doing so. It therefore seems desirable to 
subject such systems to as much scrutiny as possible as soon as possible. 
 
Western European and developing countries might therefore have to take the 
rhetorical commitment by the Umbrella Group to high standards at face value and as 
quid pro quo insist on establishing a strong review system in the framework of the 
IAR and ICA processes. The two-stage review foreseen by the IAR, which includes a 
technical review by experts, provides a formal hook for creating such a system but 
Parties will need to provide the IAR process with the necessary resources to actually 
allow for a detailed examination. If the UNFCCC review system is not endowed with 
the necessary resources, the task of scrutinising other countries’ bilateral mechanisms 
would probably fall mostly on Western European countries, as most developing 
countries would probably have no capacity to spare for this purpose. Most UNFCCC 
Parties would therefore have to blindly believe the claims that bilateral mechanisms 
adhere to high standards.  
 
Creating a strong central review capacity at UNFCCC level seems hence to be the 
only option that is acceptable to the Umbrella Group countries (minus Norway) but 
hopefully nevertheless able to assure other Parties that environmental integrity is in 
fact ensured. Still, it bears repeating that this would be a sub-optimal solution from 
the perspective of environmental integrity.   
 
One may therefore hope that transaction costs will pose a natural limit to the carbon 
market’s fragmentation. Japan and California are essentially replicating the CDM’s 
entire infrastructure for the development of methodologies and approval of projects 
at considerable cost. While these jurisdictions expect that transaction costs per 
project will be lower in their systems due to greater standardisation than in the CDM, 
the overall transaction costs of the global market are likely to be higher with several 
systems operating in parallel instead of having only one system. Transaction cost 
problems will probably be even greater for developing countries, which would have 
to act as hosts for projects from multiple schemes in parallel instead of just one as 
has been the case so far. A proliferation of mechanisms would probably be especially 
hard to manage for least-developed and other poor countries, which are often already 
overtaxed by operating the CDM. 
 
 16 
VII.  Bibliography 
 
Aasrud A., Baron R., Buchner B., McKall K., 2009, Sectoral Market Mechanisms – 
Issues for Negotiation and Domestic Implementation, International Energy Agency 
(IEA)/Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris 
[available at https://www.iea.org/papers/2009/sectoral_market_mechanisms.pdf]. 
 
Bakker St. and Seijm J., 2012, Design elements for new market mechanisms, EU Side 
event SB 36, Bonn, 16 May 2012 [available at 
http://regserver.unfccc.int/seors/attachments/get_attachment?code=06ZVP3N6CKC2
BSD98188RZMWKCJ1U6TT]. 
 
CMIA (Climate Markets & Investment Association) (2012). CMIA submission in 
response to para 81 of COP17 LCA Outcome [available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/smsn/ngo/162.pdf ]. 
 
Butzengeiger-Geyer S., Castro P., Dransfeld B., Michaelowa A., Okubo Y., Skogen 
A., Tangen K., 2010. New Market Mechanisms in a Post 2012 Climate Regime – 
Challenges and Opportunities, Report to the German Federal Environment Agency 
(unpublished). 
 
Butzengeiger S., Dransfeld B., Cames M., Michaelowa A., Healy S., 2012, New 
Market Mechanisms for Mitigation – Getting the Incentives Right, in: A. Michaelowa  
(ed.), Carbon Markets or Climate Finance? Low Carbon and Adaptation Investment 
Choices for the Developing World, 146–167. 
 
Brunnée J., 2012, COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, Leiden Journal of International Law, v. 15, 1–52.  
 
De Sépibus J., Tuerk A.,2011, New market-based mechanisms post-2012: 
institutional options and governance challenges when establishing a sectoral 
crediting mechanism, Environmental Liability, 111–130.  
 
Harrison D., Lo Passo F., Radov D., Nichols A., Klevnas P., Foss A., 2011. 
Evaluation of Incentives in International Sectoral Crediting Mechanisms, A Report 
for Enel, NERA Economic Consulting, Boston, Rome [available at 
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Enel_Report_102411.pdf]. 
 
Helme N., Whitesell W., Houdashelt M., Osornia J., Ma H., Lowe A., Polzin Th., 
2010, Global Sectoral Study: Final report, Center for Clean Air Policy, Washington, 
DC [available at 
http://www.ccap.org/docs/resources/934/CCAP%20Final%20Sectoral%20Report.pdf 
]. 
 
Japanese Government (2011). New Market Mechanisms Express. November 2011. 
 
Marcu A., 2011a, Post Durban: Moving to a fragmented carbon market world? 
Climate Change, CEPS Commentaries [available at http://www.ceps.eu/book/post-
durban-moving-fragmented-carbon-market-world]. 
 
 17 
Marcu A, 2011, The Durban Outcome, A post 2012 Framework Approach for Green 
House Gas Markets. In: The UNEP Risø Centre Energy and Carbon Finance Group, 
Progressing towards post 2012 carbon markets. 127–137. 
 
Mehling, 2011. Alternative Frameworks for International Climate Cooperation: 
Towards a Systematic Assessment Matrix. ICPIA Working paper 2011.  
[available at http://icpia-project.wifo.ac.at/docs/WP_7.pdf]. 
 
New Zealand government, 2012. Presentation made by New Zealand on 18 May at 
the UNFCCC workshop in Bonn on various market approaches. Available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120519_nz_1850.pdf 
 
Schmidt J., Helme N., Lee J., Houdashelt M., 2008, Sector-based approach to the 
post-2012 climate change policy architecture. Climate Policy  8, 494–515. 
 
Schneider L., Cames M., 2009, A framework for a sectoral crediting mechanism in a 
post-2012 climate regime, Report for the Global Wind Energy Council, Öko-Institut. 
Berlin. [available at http://www.oeko.de/oekodoc/904/2009-022-en.pdf]. 
 
Sterk W., 2012, Current Proposals and Positions on New Market Mechanisms, 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy, Wuppertal [available at 
http://www.jiko-
bmu.de/english/background_information/publications/doc/1152.php]. 
 
Sterk W., Arens Ch., Mersmann Fl., Wang-Helmreich H., Wehnert T., 2011. On the 
Road Again. Progressive Countries Score a Realpolitik Victory in Durban While the 
Real Climate Continues to Heat Up, Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, 
Energy, Wuppertal [available at 
http://wupperinst.org/en/publications/publications/wi/a/s/ad/1593/]. 
 
Sterk W., Arens Ch., Kreibich N., Mersmann Fl., Wehnert T., 2012. Sands Are 
Running Out for Climate Protection. The Doha Climate Conference Once Again 
Saves the UN Climate Process While Real Climate Action Is Shelved for Later, 
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, Energy, Wuppertal [available at 
http://wupperinst.org/en/info/details/wi/a/s/ad/1979/] 
 
Streck Ch., Lin J., 2008. Making Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performance 
and the Need for Reform. The European Journal of International Law 19, 409–442. 
 
United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2007, Good practice for 
technology needs assessments, background paper. Workshop on sharing good 
practices with conducting technology needs assessments, Bangkok, Thailand, 27-29 
June 2007 [available at http://unfccc.int/ttclear/pdf/Workshops/Bangkok/Paper.pdf] 
 
United Nations Framework  on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2011, Outcome of the 
work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention , FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add. 1, 15. March 2012, decision 2/CP/17.  
 
United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2012a, Draft decision -
/CP.18, Agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan, advance unedited version 
[available at 
 18 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/doha_nov_2012/decisions/application/pdf/cop18_agre
ed_outcome.pdf].  
 
United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2012b, Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Views on a 
framework for various approaches, Submissions from Parties, 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.4, 11 April 2012. Note: some of the country 
submissions or update can be found in the 7 addenda of the document. 
[available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/awglca15/eng/misc04.pdf]. 
 
United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2012c, Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Views on a new 
market mechanism,  Submissions from Parties, FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.6, 11 
April 2012. Note: some of the country submissions or update can be found in the  
addenda of the document. 
[available at  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/awglca15/eng/misc06.pdf]. 
 
United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2012d, Technical Paper 
established by the Secretariat on “Various approaches, including opportunities for 
using markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation 
actions, bearing in mind different circumstances of developed and developing 
countries”, FCCC/TP/2012/4, 24 August 2012 [available  at 
http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_search/items/6911.php?priref=
600007027]. 
 
